GS-PRED-003 · LINKA

Cover geometry at Linka

SPATIAL / COVER GEOMETRY · SEALED — OUTCOME PENDING

A prediction about where the volcanic cover ends, sealed before the drillholes that will test it exist. It predicts no tungsten, no grade and no mineralisation of any kind.

1. The prediction

Within the declared domain at Linka, the base of the Bates Mountain Tuff lies at an approximately constant pre-volcanic elevation of 1771.2 m, not at a constant depth below present topography.

For any future drillhole whose published log reports young volcanic cover from surface within the domain:

predicted cover depth (m) = 3DEP 1 m lidar collar elevation − 1771.2

tolerance ±8 m

The two models being separated are simple and they disagree. If the ground surface rises 20 m but the buried surface stays at the same elevation, you must drill about 20 m further to reach it. A constant-depth model says you always drill 16.8 m. Those predictions diverge, they are measurable, and one of them is wrong.

2. What is already known, and therefore earns nothing

What is prospective is the depth to the base of cover at locations not yet drilled, logged and published.

3. Targets, frozen before analysis

LNK3-T01 point 513859 / 4353036, collar 1808.4 m — basement at 37.2 ± 8 m. Partially known, gradeable.

LNK3-T02 southwest extension zone, 0.087 km² — predicted depth P10/P50/P90 = 22.2 / 31.6 / 41.8 m.

LNK3-T03 western regional zone, 0.158 km² — predicted depth p5/p50/p95 = −3.5 / 6.5 / 23.2 m; 17% of the zone is predicted to carry no cover at all.

LNK3-N01 low ground, 0.193 km² — across the half of this zone at or below 1771.2 m, basement within 3 m of surface. Falsified by more than 10 m of cover there.

N01 is the one that points the other way, and the only one a shovel can falsify.

4. How it fails

5. Counter-evidence, in our own words

6. Retrospective performance is not a predictive result

Against the four already-known points, excluding the calibration point, this model's mean absolute error is 1.10 m and the baselines' are 15–18 m. That is training-only and carries zero prospective credit. It establishes that sealing a prospective test is defensible. It establishes nothing else, and n = 3 with one of those a one-sided bound and one marginally violated.

7. Verification

Prediction SHA-256 (sealed original)
091764c3b29f08e11d3006987beefb0e9aaed3440dce8a3753505fa514d52ad1

Encrypted original SHA-256
a6eeae3d241266ee9391250a883543349b96170a11fa3e820897826b301c5ad3

Preregistration SHA-256 (stamped before any analysis, 2026-09-12T08:16:54Z)
2fc361a36f43ec9ae1d24ec82126d8dbb454085eab9afb20e94bca71ed771917

Gate-interpretation note SHA-256 (stamped before the seal)
3dba9c03cdffaceac373bd9dcff3b44f09b1607b20091f9390d0c3a60ff9140b

T01 prior-knowledge note SHA-256
8f729044de4e512e95f8943595ab97fb26015be9f1e130b9624f7f64174e5611

Package rollup SHA-256
4c99c0747789411997e57dece36f74093a4fa1dc0f04d23208b966654969fd11

Evidence corpus SHA-256
e65bbac7ef4870361fbba78f47bb72cb4ae555a5f2c12357c9f05f90601419ca

Status SEALED — INDEPENDENT OUTCOME PENDING

The complete original is published now, encrypted, as GS_PRED_003_PREDICTION_V1.enc. Anyone can hash it today. When the resolving drillholes are published we release the key, and anyone can decrypt it and confirm the plaintext hashes to the value above — so the file cannot have been written afterwards.

# after the key is published
openssl enc -d -aes-256-cbc -pbkdf2 -iter 200000 \
  -in GS_PRED_003_PREDICTION_V1.enc -out GS_PRED_003_PREDICTION_V1.json -pass file:key.txt
sha256sum GS_PRED_003_PREDICTION_V1.json
# must output 091764c3b29f08e11d3006987beefb0e9aaed3440dce8a3753505fa514d52ad1

8. Independent timestamp

The hash of the encrypted prediction was submitted to an independent third-party timestamping service at 2026-09-12T08:44:56Z, the day of sealing. We do not operate that service and cannot move the date it recorded. The receipt is retained as an internal verification artefact and is available on request.

What you can check today without trusting us at all. The encrypted original is published above and its SHA-256 is fixed. When the key is released, decrypting it must reproduce the prediction hash exactly. A file published before the resolving drillholes existed cannot have been written after them.

Being improved. The public verification step is being replaced by a timestamp token from an independent Time Stamping Authority under RFC 3161, so that the receipt can be downloaded and verified here rather than requested. Until that is in place this page claims no more than the line above.

The full public record and the frozen target geometry are both downloadable.

9. What this does not claim

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